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This paper examines the Freeman-Lazear works councillworker involvement model against 
the empirical backdrop of two different industrial relations systems: the British 
voluntaristic system , and the German system of mandatory works councils. We fmd that 
in nonunion British frrms worker involvement increases economic performance, but in the 
union frrms there are negative effects. The implication is 也at local distributive conflict 
can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen , as predicted by the model. 
ln Germany , where cen甘alized collective bargaining reduces local dis甘ibutive conflict, we 
find that a mandate can be advantageous , again as predicted by the model. However , the 
strai~jacket of a mandate is shown to disadvantage small German frrffis. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the impact of the involvement of workers in their 
companies on various indicators of frrm performance. A comparison is drawn between 
Germany , with its 甘adition of mandatory works councils , and Britain , long characterized 
by its voluntaristic system of industrial relations. The theoretical backdrop to 也is ioquiry 
is the influential model of direct participation offered by Freeman and Lazear (1995) . 
Interest in worker participation is at 組 all-time high , and the influence of 出e
German institution is palpable. Practical manifestations are the works council directive 
enacted into law by the European Commission (Official Joumal , 1994), establishing 
multinational works councils in European-level enterprises , and a backlog of more 
thorough-going participation initiatives including the proposed European Company Statute 
and the draft Fifth Directive on Company Law (Addison and Sie悅目， 1997). Even in the 
United States , stimulated by a precipitous dec1ine in private-sector unionism , the recent 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (1994a, 1994b) actively 
considered adoption of German-type participative institutions. 
A comparison of the effect of German works councils with analogous though less 
authoritative institutions in Britain (in the form of consultation and joint consultative 
committees) allows one to consider a number of questions raised in 出e participation 
literature. Specifically , the distinction between endogenously chosen (the U .K.) and 
mandatory worker participa位on (Germany) assists in guiding the measurement of e仔ects
of participation on frrm performance . At same time , comparison of the two coun凹的
addresses concems having to do with the alIeged shortfall of participation in regular 
m訂kets that have motivated much of the policy debate. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a modified version of the 
Freeman-Lazear model to fLX ideas as to the relation between worker involvement and the 
relevant dimensions of fum performance. Section 3 provides institutional detail. The 
datasets employed, the WIRS and the Hannover Firm Panel , are reviewed in Section 4, 
toge也er with the equation specifications. Section 5 charts the impact of the participative 
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institutions on measures of frrm productivity , profitability , wages , and employment. An 
interpretative section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Coojectures 
Our starting point is the model of the works council provided by Freeman and 
Lazear (1995). Figure 1 is a modification of their basic diagram. The model we present is 
somewhat more general , relating as it does the intensity of structured "worker 
involvement," rather than works council power, to the tota1 surplus of 出e enterprise. 
Specifically，出e R(x) 如此tion maps 也is joint surplus against the level of worker 
inv01vement, x. As shown , al也ough 組 absence of any formal worker involvement is 
consistent with some positive surplus , the introduction of increasingly structured forms of 
involvement yields increases in surplus , at least up to some point. Accordingly , R(x) has 
an inverted-U shape. We add flesh to this barebones concept of 、甘uctured worker 
involvement," and the forms it takes in Britain and Germany in section 3. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
More specifically , Freeman and Lazear 訂gue 血at the joint surplus will increase 
Wl由 worker involvement both because management and labor have nonoverlapping 
relevant information sets and by reason of the creativity of discussion. Thus , for example, 
the provision of objective infornlation by the flfm increases efficiency by facilitating 
worker cooperation in tough times when labor might otherwise be disinclined to believe 
management assertions as to the state of nature. Similarly , the disclosure of private 
information by the worker side raises the joint surplus. Proceeding one stage further than 
information disclosure per se , consultation allows new solutions to production and other 
workplace problems because discussion is creative. Additionally , participation or 
codetermination is said to provide workers with greater security , thereby encouraging 
them to take a longer view of the prospects of the firm. These are the advantages. The 
downside is 出at worker involvement has the disadvantage that it delays decisionmaking. A 
further disadvantage noted by Freeman and Lazear (1995 , 29) 自由at as worker 
involvement increases there comes a point where "management does not have enough 
control over decisions." For both reasons , there is thus some optimum level of worker 
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involvement, x* in the figure. If 也e R(x) function did not have a maximum, then the 
issue of choosing the degree of worker involvement would not arise. 
Decisions about the desired amount of worker involvement are determined not only 
by 由e R(x) function , but also by distributional considerations. Freeman and Lazear appeal 
to standard results in barga~g 也eory and argue 出at the worker share in the surplus , 
s(x) , increases as x increases. 叭1t simply , knowledge is power. As the workers' 
knowledge increases, so too must their share. Thus , information disclosure by 
m組agement is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it validates m組ageme帥's claims as 
to the state of nature but on the other it potentially facilitates rent seeking on the part of 
workers. Similarly , workers will only divulge their private information to management if 
they have some say in how 由at information is used (Freeman and Laze缸， 1995 , 39). 
Greater worker involvement on these lines means less management discretion. 
Accordingly , worker share in the surplus may be expected to rise. 
The second bold curve in Figure 1 shows the firm' s pro白的 F(x) ， as a funçtion of 
worker involvement. Because of the assumption 也at the worker share increases with 
worker involvement, F(x) peaks before R(x) does. As a result, there will be an under-
proyjsion of worker involvement, Xf. This result is used by Freeman and Lazear as a 
justification for a participation mandate; specifically , one that guarantees x.. 
Implicit in Freeman and Lazear's 甘eatment is a further profit functioo , G(x) , 
shown by the dashed line in Figu~e 1. O(x) is predicated on a di仔erent s(x) 如nction - a 
smaller increase in the work:ers' share as worker involvement increases , made possible by 
a partial decoupling of production and dis仕ibution. Such a decoupling is achievable , they 
argue (Freeman and Laze缸， 1995 , 32) , in regimes where wages are determined outsir1~ 
the frrffi under cen甘alized coUective bargaining (or, we would add , an absence of 
collective bargaining). It can be seen 由at the maximum of 由is curve is closer to 由e
participa位on optimum. In 也is situation, a mandate of x. wilI increase participation, but 
less necessary 血an where there is 也e local dis甘ibutive bargaining underlying F(x). 
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Next; tuming to the worker side, where there is no local bargaíning (corresponding 
to profit function G(x)) , worker choices are ÍlTelevant. However, in the more gen釘al
case, worker choices will matter. For example, given the profit function F(x) , if workers 
could choose the amount of worker ïnvolvement, they would select Jt.v. At Jt.v血e
difference between R(x) and F(x) is maximized, with workers seeking to maximize their 
share of 出e joint surplus. This exceeds the socially optimal level of worker involvement, 
just as management's choice fell short of 也at level. If worker involvement is the subject 
of bargaining , the outcome wilI lie between Xw 剖ld 焉， according to relative bargaining 
power. As can be seeo , such bargaining can result in increases or decreases in the joint 
surplus. 
In sum, without collective bargaining, the degree of worker involvement is more 
likely to be close to the social optimum than with it. To repeat, the relevant profit 
func位on for 也is case is 也e G(x) function，也e peak of which lies closer to x﹒也an does 
出at of the F(x) 我lnction. With cen甘alized bargaining the position is similar, if we accept 
也at cen甘alization means that there is less scope for distributive bargaining at locallevel. 
The situation is least predictable from an efficiency perspective if there are s缸ong unions 
toge也er with local bargaining rights because the F(x) profit function now applies. The 
introduction of a mandate requiring x. worker involvement wiU. here havea more marked 
effect on flIm profit th組 in union-free environments or situations of cen甘alized
barg也ning.
We are now in a position to summarize the predictions of 由e theory. In union-free 
envlIonments : 
(a) the level of worker involvement will be chosen so that the total surplus is close to the 
optimum, x.; 
(b) an increase in worker involvement will only be adopted if it increases profit and 
consequently total surplus. (Of course, for there to be an increase in worker involvemt. 
the prior level must have been rendered inappropriate by changing circumstances.) 
Changes in worker involvement are therefore expected to be directly linked to changes 
total surplus. 
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And for union regimes with local distributive bargaining: 
(a) the level of worker involvement is unlikely to be chosen so 出at total surplus is at or 
near a maXlrnum; 
(b) any observed increase in worker involvernent need not be accornpanied by increases in 
total surplus , but will be associated with a decline in profitability. Again , however , we 
should look to a relationship between changes in variables. 
Particularly in the nonunion case, because the choice of the amount of worker 
involvement is endogenous - and distributive bargaining is no 也reat (curve G(x) applies) -
we do not expect a link between the level of 也is variable and the level of the joint 
surplus . Nonunion firms are managed so as to achieve near-maximum total surplus. 
Whatever level of worker involvernent, be it high or low , that is necessary to achieve such 
performance will already have been chosen by management. Thus we expect no link 
between levels here. For unionized frrffis , on the other hand , the situation is more 
complicated because of the joint nature of con甘01. Too high a level of worker 
involvement would be revealed by a negative association between the level of worker 
involvement and the level of total surplus. 
A comparison of levels can be expected to be informative where worker 
involvement is at least partly outside the con甘01 of the frrm , as in Germany. In the 
German case, works councils are mandatory but not automatic; 也ey have to be activated 
by the worker side . W orkers can be expected to choose a works council if it increases 
their share of the joint surplus. Where observed , therefore , works councils should be 
associated with lower profitability. As far as total surplus is concemed , an appropriately 
choseo mandate - where this is possible - should increase it. 
In reality , a rnandate has to confront 也e problem of frrm heterogeneity. A diagram 
such as Figure 1 can be drawn for each firrn. There is 00 reason to expect the maximum 
of R(x) to correspond to the same level of worker involvement in each case. Most 
obviously , large firms are more likely to benefit from 也e structured worker iovolvement 
implied by a works council than their smal1er counterparts: x. wiII be higher for large than 
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small frrms . The implication 自由at although total surplus in large frrffis could be 
increased by a works council mandate , this is unlikely to obtain in small frrms. 
3. Institutional Framework 
We think of structured worker involvement as a continuum, ranging from 
information provision through consultation to participation/codetermination. The 
mechanisms whereby worker involvement is furthered , and the role of government, are of 
course quite di釘erent in the two countries. We begin our discussion wi出 the German 
case, often regarded as 也e exemplar of industrial democracy and hence located at 也c
upper bound of the continuum. 
In Germany , information, consultation, and participation are formal1y prescribed 
by law and enshrined in the apparatus of the Works Council (Betriebsrat). 1 This body 
shares some similarities with its British "counterp訂t'" 出e ‘joint consultative committee , 
described below , even if the latter is nowhere near as authoritative. 
Although the German works council is mandatory , it is not automatic. First there 
is a size threshold of five permanent employees , all of whom must be at least 18 years of 
age and three of whom must have at least six months' service. Second, a works council 
must be elected. 1ust three employees with voting rights (namely , 18-year olds and 
above) , or a 甘ade union represented in the establishment, are needed to call for a works 
meeting to elect an electoral board , which is then responsible for holding the election. 2 
Once this procedure is activated , the works council is a fait accompli. 
The works council is elected by the entire labor force , with the exception of 
employers and senior executives. All employees wi也 voting rights are entitled to submit 
lists of candidates provided these have the support of at least 5 percent of employees. 
U nions may submit a list of candidates without having to meet this minimum requirement; 
union lists must be signed by two representatives. Wage earners and salaried employees 
may have separate or, as is increasingly the norm , joint lists of candidates. Elec位ons are 
direct and by secret ballot, wi也 winners elected on the basis of proportional representation 
from these lists. 
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The law fixes the size of 出e works council , which ranges from one to 惱的-one
members for establishments with up to 9,000 employees. For larger establishments , two 
additional members are added for each increment of 3,000 employees. 3 The expenses of 
the works council apparatus are bome by the employer, including release time for part-
time councillors and the wages of full-time councillors. The number of the latter is a 
“nction of the employment size of the plant. 4 As we shall see , the influence of the works 
council also depends (in part) on plant size , so that it is not s甘ictly correct to refer to the 
German legislation as a one-size-fits-all mandate. 
Tuming therefore to the rules goveming the information , consultation, and 
codetermination rights of works councils , the employer has frrst to provide the works 
council with both timely and "comprehensive" information to enable it to discharge its 
general duties and on 叩ecific matters relating to manpower planning and the introduction 
of new technology and production processes. The quantity of information (and 
consultation) is a function of establishment size. Thus , in establishments with more than 
20 employees , information must be given "in full and in good time" on reductions in 
operations and the in甘oduction of new working methods , inter al., and in plants with 
more 血泊 1∞ employees an economic committee must be set up. This standing body , 
appointed by the works council , has to be fu l1y informed on the current and 臼ture
economic situation of the frrm and be supplied with all relevant economic and financial 
information. 
Consultation righ~可 for their part cover planned structural alterations to the plant 
and prospective changes in equipment and working methods 出at affect job requirements , 
all decisions relating to manpower planning , and individual dismissals. 1n the latter case, 
failure to consult resulû可 in the dismissal being rendered null and void. 
The ha11mark of the German institution, however, is its codetermination rightsι 
"social matters." These include the commencement and termination of working hours; ti 
regulation of overtime and reduced working hours; leave arrangements; the in甘oductioI
and use of technical devices to monitor employee performance; remuneration 
arrangements , including the fixing of job and bonus rates 'and other forms of performance ‘ 
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related pay; and hωl由 and safety measures. Failure to reach agreement in any of these 
areas leads to their adjudication through a fon)1a~ çonciliation apparatus. 
Where the establishment normally employs more 出個 20 employees wi由 voting
rights , the works council al ,so has a set of somewhat weak:er consent rights covering the 
engagement, grading/regrading, and transfer of workers within the frrm. Consent rights 
also obtain in the case of individual dismissals , noted earlier. If tþe worb可 council
withholds its consent, however, the employer can apply to the labor court for a decisioß in 
lieu of that consent. 
The works council can negotiate social compensation p]ans (Sozialpläne) and works 
agreemenv可 (Betriebsvereinbarungen). In all plants norma11y employing more than 20 
employees, works councils have separate rights to demand compensation for the 
dislocation caused by plant closings, m~jor changes in organization, and the like. Social 
plans、 may be regarded as a special case of works agreements. The latter cannot cover 
remuneration and other conditions of employment unless expressly au也orized under the 
relevant indus甘y/regional collective agreement. In fact , framework agreements at industry 
level have increasingly made provision for their implementation at local level. But beyond 
曲的， there is every indication 也at bilateral plant level agreements have in practice ranged 
well beyond those prescribed by the law (Müller-Jentsch, 1995 , 60-61). This proliferation 
of works agreements might therefore hint at rent seeking behavior, although such behavior 
can clearly find expression outside of forma1 agreement. 5 
A final issue is the relation between works councils and unions per se. Works 
councils are formally independent of unions , but the links between the two have become 
increasingly close. Today not only are the large m~jority of works councillors union 
members (74 percent) but some two-thirds are also union nominees (Niedenho缸， 1995) 
Although union density is not a datum in wor}Q可 council regimes , we were unable to 
exploit this variation in our emp甘ical ana1ysis of the German data (see below).6 
The British case is more briefly dealt with given the traditiona1 voluntaristic 
approach towards worker involvement. 7 The forms tak:en by worker involvement are 
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much less well-defined than in Germany and we have been guided in our measurements 
primari1y by the information available in the dataset, the W orkplace Industria1 Relations 
Survey (WIRS) , on which more below. We shall distinguish between formal and informal 
involvement, drawing on section L ("Consultation and Communìcation") of the survey 
questionnaire. Under the heading of formal methods of involvement, our main measure is 
obtained from question L1 , namely , whether the establishment has a joint manager-
employee committee "primarily concerned wi也 consultation rather than negotiation" (and 
excluding committees dealing with single issues such as health and safety). We shall refer 
to "these bodies as "joint consultative committees" (JCCs). Under the informal heading, 
our measure relies on question L 19, namely , whether management uses regular roeetings 
to "communicate or consu1t with their employees". These regular mee位ngs include 
"quality circles," other problem-solving groups , and "briefing groups". The survey 
identifies other dimensions of communica位on and consultation, including the topics 
considered at the meetings , but these are not exploited in the present 仕eatment (but for 
fUI油er analysis , see Siebert and W缸， 1996). 
JCCs are almost as prevalent in union as nonunion establishments, according to the 
WIRS data. Among establishments recognising unions , about 20 percent have JCCs in our 
sample; the corresponding figure for nonunion establishments is 18 percent. Regular 
meetings to communicate or consult - our informal measure - are somewhat more 
prevalent in union establishments (74 percent) than nonunion (61 percent). 
As was argued in section 2, it is important to consider not only levels of but also 
changes in communication and consultation in the British case (where communication and 
consultation are endogenous to a greater extent than in Germany). U nfortunately , the 
WIRS considers only positive changes (that 尬， increases) , namely , "any change within the 
last 3 y側的 with the aim of increasing employee involvement in the operation of the 
enterprise" (question L23). Again we focus on JCCs and regular informal meetings . 
Increases in JCCs include reorganization , or the setting up of a new committee, while 
mcreases 10 meetings include more meetings for the purposes of generaI consultation, on 
produc位on or productivity , and for discussionJ communication of 0由er topics including job 
appraisal. 
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In this paper , therefore, measurement of worker involvement in British firms boils 
down to the machinery of a joint consultative council (JCC) and/or regular meetings to 
communicate or consult with employees. Both of these are zero-one dummies. They are 
used in level and change form. ln the German case , the measure of worker involvement is 
whether the frrm has a works council. For Britain, we also construct an index of worker 
involvement (INV) taking the value of 0 if there is neither a JCC nor regular 
communication/consultation meetings , of 1 where there are just 
communication/consultation meetings , of 2 if there is only a JCC , and of 3 if there are 
both mee位ngs and a JCC. An analogous index of change in worker involvement 
(NEWINV) is a1so used, based on changes in communication/consultation meetings and/or 
JCCs. The index of change in worker involvement is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is measured in change form. 
4. Data and Specification 
Our British dataset 自由e 1990 WIRS , a survey within England, Scotland and 
Wales of 2,061 establishments employing 25 or more workers. The response rate was 83 
percent. (See Millward et al. , 1992 , for a complete description of 也is survey and 
information on its precursors of 1984 and 1980.) Larger workplaces were oversampled by 
design and a11 our results make use the weights included in WIRS to make them 
representative of the national sample of establishments. The sample is restricted to private 
nonagricultural establishments. The sample is 863 for the employment change equations , 
but falls to around 5∞ when the other measures of performance are used due to missing 
values . 
For the analysis of the British data, we emphasize the union-nonunion distinction. 
This distinction is based upon whether establishments have a written agreement 
recognizing unions , either manual or nonmanual , for the purposes of negotiating pay and 
conditions of employment. Our samples are split almost equally between union and 
nonunion establishments . 
The German data used in this inquiry were taken from the frrst wave (conducted in 
1994) of a panel study investigating various aspects of frrm behavior and performance. 
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The research proje仗， the Hannover Firm Panel , comprises four annual waves (see below). 
The population covered encompasses al1 manufacturing establishments with at least five 
employees in the province of Lower Saxony. The sample of establishments is stratified 
according to firm size and industry , with oversampling of larger frrms. 8 
As with the WIRS , mterviews were held with the owner or top manager of the 
establishment, often assisted by personnel management in the larger frrms. Some 1,025 
establishments or 51 percent of all those approached agreed to take part in the frrst wave. 
Despite the high attrition rate，由e deviation between the acωal and planned s虹atification
is relatively small. 
The questionnaire used in the survey asks approximately 90 numbered questions. 
The questions vary by wave. The frrst and the third waves focus squarely on labour 
market issues, whereas the second and fourth waves - which omit the works council 
question - focus rather more . on intemational issues. Themes addressed in the former 
waves include personnel s甘ucture and development, wages and salaries, working time, the 
determinants of employment, and frrm performance. 9 
Although. the item re中onse rate is relatively high for most questions in the survey , 
almost one-third of the sample (318 establishments) responded 也at they did not know the 
level of workplace union density. Furthermore, inspection of the data led us to question 
the accuracy of the positive responses (on which , see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner , 
1992b). In the circumstances, we determined that it would be misleading to provide 
estimates of the association between union density and the outcome indicators. This is 
unfortunate because union density might usefully augment the dummy variable indicating 
出e presence or otherwise of a works council in the outcome equations. That said, unliI 
the British case, the union-nonunion distinction does not motivate the German analysis 
which instead focuses on differences between small and large establishments. 
It is important to note that, despite their mandatory natu凹， in weighted terms 
works councils occur in just 20.1 percent of the German establishments , even if these dG 
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account for the lion'sshare , 73.4 percent, of employment. Similar results have been 
reported by Frick and Sadowski (1995) in an employment-based survey of establishments. 
Turning next to the issue of specification, we first review our four outcome 
variables. Broadly speaking , apart from the fact that 也ree of 出e four outcome indicators 
are in levels for Germany (not inappropriate in terms of the applied theoretical model in 
section 2 given "mandatory participationη ， we were able to achieve reasonable 
correspondence between、 the performance equations for the two coun甘ies. The most 
notable difference 挖出at the German productivity variable is a continuous measure of 
value added per worker un1ike its British productivity change counterpart, which is a 
su~jectively defined five-category measure (derived from 血em組ager' s answer to the 
question "In your opinion how does the level of labour productivity here compare wi也
what it was 3 years ago?"). lO The dependent variable in the German wage equation 扭曲e
wage and salary bil1 divided by the number of employees, similar to the British measure, 
also in levels, which is a weighted average calculated over separateskill categories. 11 The 
three-category relative profit measure is to all intents and purposes the same for the two 
countries (derived from the answer to the question "How would you assess the financial 
performance of this establishment compared with other establishments in the same 
indus甘y? "). Likewise, the employment change variable for Germany closely corresponds 
to 曲at for Britain, . each being calculated over a three ye訂 interval.
Our key independent variables are of course the participation measures. We earlier 
commented in some detail on the British measures of formal and informal worker 
involvement, as well as 也e construction of an index fashioned out of each. We also 
described our measures of the changes in worker involvement. By con甘ast the German 
measure is simpler and blunter: a single dummy variable signifying 由e presence or 
otherwise of a works council. The German dataset does not allow us to distinguish 
between possible "types" of works councils. Given that 曲e powers of the works council 
do vary formally (and likely in practice also) by establishment size (see section 3) , 
however, we present results for the total sample and for a subsample of smaller 
establishments . employing between 21 個d 1∞ employees. The lower probability of 
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observing works councils among such smaller firms provides additional grounds for this 
sample construction. 
There are clearly many other factors that affect both levels of and changes in frrm 
performance and we need to con甘01 for these. At root, firm performance must be 
determined by management ability or good fortune. The variables included in our 
performance equations can bethought of as more or less adequately proxying these elusive 
quali位的. Performance will a1so be determined by cyclical factors , and by the degree of 
risk of the industry. 
Our con甘ols for the German and British samples are similar, although of course 
we are constrained by the data at our disposal. (A comparable set of controls is used in 
Fernie 缸ld Metcalf, 1995.) ln addition to broad indus甘y dummies (9 in the case of 
Britain, 31 in the case of Gennany) , we con甘01 for several characteristics of the 
workforce such as the importance of female workers , part timers , ski l1ed manual workers , 
個d shiftworkers. These proportions might be thought of as picking up factors relating t，。
由e cyclicality and/or riskiness of the establishment' s market, so 血at in general - outside 
of the wage equation - we have no clear-cut priors. For example, a establishment using 
many part timers might be subject to cyclical demand changes. If mistakes are more likely 
to be made in such situations, then performance could be adversely affected. A further 
variable falling within this category is whether or not the establishment produces a product 
primarily for export. 
Variables more directly related ωmanagement ability include , frrstly , the age of 
the establishment. (Note that establishment age in the German sample is not continuous 
since the survey only records whether the establishment was set up before 1960.) The age 
variable might pick up the possibility that the newer entrants have the better ideas. 
Alternative旬， the long-lived establishmen~可 might have proven management , so that the 
outcome could go either way. Second旬， the payment system variables - namely , the use 
of payment by results for some sections of the workforce , and the use of profit-sharing 
schemes - might indicate a forward-looking management, keen to expeliment. 12 A similar 
argument justifies the . inclusion of the technology variable , indicating the use of automated 
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or "s個te of the art" plant and equipment. In the British case , we are also able to include a 
union density variable which is relevant because it could cons甘ain experimentation. (Note , 
也is variable is also relevant for nonunion establishments; even if they do oot recognize 
unions for collective bargaining purposes , they will still have union members.) 
Thirdly , market dominance might signal managerial ability - as well as the 
possibility of monopoly rents. We control for market dominance in several ways: 
establishment size, whether the establishment is p紅t of a multi-plant firm , and whether 
the establishment has few competitors. Managers in smaller establishments might also 
have di前erent tastes - a desire for "independence" - which could translate into lower 
performance. 
Finally, the German dataset offers possibilities of further variables that are specific 
to individual outcome equations. For the profit equation, there are dummies denoting , in 
the opinion of the management respondent, excessive wage and nonwage costs. And in the 
employment change equation, there are dummies identi句ing short-time working and 
wages exceeding those set in the indus住y tariff agreement. For the wage (and value-
added) equation(s) the length of the average working week also enters as a regressor. A 
capacity utilization measure proxying demand conditions is furthermore incorporated in 
the value-added , pro鼠， and employment change equa位。肘， where a direct association is 
expected. The variable takes the form of an index constructed from responses to a six-
element categorical ques位。n in the survey , the lowest value of the index characterizing 
capacity utilization of less than 85 percent. 
5. Findings 
Summary findings for Germany and Britain are presented in Table 1. Full results 
for Britain are contained in Tables 2 through 5, distinguishing between nonunion and 
union establishrnents. Detailed findings for Germany are given in Tables 6 也rough 9，出IS
time distinguishing smaller establishments from the full sample. Broadly speaking, the 
British results for the index measure of information and consultation suggest that worker 
involvement tends to have positive effects in nonunion estab1ishments , but insignificant to 
negative e釘ects in the union group. For Germ組y ， any favorable impact of works councils 
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is confined to 也e full sample. We next consíder these results and their implications in 
more detail. 
[Table 1 near here] 
Britain. Taking the British evidence frrst , consider the results for the labor productivity 
change measure , which we take to be closely related to the joint surplus. From the frrst 
two columns of Table 2 it can be seen that in the nonunion case changes in both formal 
and informal communication and consultation produce the anticipated positive coefficient 
estimates for bOth forma1 and informal communication, whether the variables are taken 
separately or as an ordered index. 
[Tables 2 and 3 near here] 
Yet for the union establishments, Table 3 indicates that there is no significant 
effect of either type of communication and consultation, or for the ordered index. We 
interpret these results as indicating 也at competitive pressures cause nonunion 
establishments to adopt beneficial changes in communication and consultation , but that 
there is no sign of 出is phenomenon in union establishments. 
The picture is similar, though less clear-cut, for the employment change variable, 
while recognizing that employment change is not such a good indicator of movements in 
the joint surplus . As can be seen from the last column of Table 2, for nonunion 
establishments the coe前icient estimate for the formal communication and consultation 
change measure is positive but statistical1y insignificant, while 也at for the informal variant 
is positive and statistical1y significant. Combining formal and informal measures into an 
index (see the third column of Table 2) yields a highly statistically significant positive 
coefficient estimate. 
For union establishments (the last two columns in Table 3)，崗位e are opposing 
effects: increases in formal communication and consultation are associated with negative 
15 
employment change's~ : while inéreases in the informal type seèm to be beneficial. 
Nevertheless , the ordered index shows a significantly negative association. 
[Tables 4 and 5 near here] 
As for the level of finan仁ial performance, the commurtiéation and corisultation 
variables as well as the index - now all in levels - are generally insignificarit for the 
nonuniöri ' samplé. These results are reported in the frrst two cohl1nns öf Table 4, and 
accord with ouf priors: management in nonunion frrms chooses levèls of wörker 
involvement, hígh or low , so as to achieve near-maximum performance. However, in the 
sample of union establishments , by con甘a哎， there are c1ear signs of a negative effect for 
the various measures of worker involvement (see the frrst two columns of Table 5). Most 
notab旬， the results for the ordered index indicate. a sharply negative effect. 
Broadly speaking , the wage results are the other side of the fmancia1 performance 
coin. That is to say , worker involvement appears to raise wages in nonunion 
establishments but to have no discernible impact among their union counterparts. On the 
whole, these results are favorable to the view that, because the level of worker 
involvement is chosen to optimize performance in the nonunion establishment, there can 
be no association between 也at magnitude and the level of plant performance. However, in 
union establishments too much worker involvement could well be chøsen. 
Space cons甘aints prevent much discussion of the coe旺icients for the con甘01
variables. Focusing therefore on the productivi句 growth equation, we note 由at 也is
measure of performance is higher for older establishments, within establishments operating 
a payment-by-resul~電 scheme and/or a profit-sharing scheme, and among establishments 
with lower union density. These results tend to obtain across union and nonunion regim{ 
alike. 
These British results are likely to be compared with those of Femie and Metcalf 
(1 995). (See also Kersley and Martin , 1995.) However, our 甘eatment differs in 
comparing changes over time in performance with changes over time in worker 
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involvement. This enables us focus on a given establishment' s decisions through time, 
rather than comparing different establishments (which we see as essentially noncomparable 
in the British case , at least in nonunion establishments , given the endogenous nature of 
the worker involvement). We also emphasize the different decision processes in nonunion 
and union establishments , and the zone of indeterminacy that surrounds decisions 00 
worker involvement in the latter. 
Germa份﹒ The German results are presented in Tables 6 through 9. Throughout a 
distinction is drawn between the full sample and a subsample of smaller finns employing 
between 21 組d 1∞ workers. I3 Among the latt仗， roughly one-half of 由e frrms have 
works councils , and the statutory powers of the works council are a datum. Unlike the 
British case, it wiU be recalled 出at the impact of the work.~ council is measured by the 
coefficient estimate on a simple dichotomous variable indicating the presence or otherwise 
of a works council. The limitation of 由is participation covariate - in addition to its 
bluntness - is 由前， for our sample at least, a11 frrllls with 1 ，α沁 or more employees have 
works councils. U nfortunately , with 曲的 dataset we are unable to construct an index of 
worker involvement (although for one such attempt with German data, see Addison and 
W agner , 1997) or otherwise distinguish between "types" of works council. In any event, 
it remains true that the powers of the works council exceed those of a British JCC. 
[Table 6 near here] 
We next discuss the productivity , employment change , profitability , and wage 
results in tum . Beginning with value-added per worker , the most notable result from 
Table 6 is the difference in works council impact as between the full sample and the 
smaller frrm subsample. For the former , works councils are associated with higher 
productivity. No such relation is found among smaller frrffis. For Jarger frrms ， 出凹， it 
appears that the benefits at甘ibuted to works councils by their proponents are real. One 
interpretation would be that large firms need councils - or analogous forms of govemance 
apparatus - to overcome the problems emphasized by the collective voice model , 
stemming 仕om the public g∞ds nature of the workplace. Smaller frrms , on the other 
hand , may face altogether less difficulty in ascertaining worker preferences and in 
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monitoring worker effort. Despite 曲的 difference ， the results are at odds with early studies 
of works council impact 由at pointed to significant1y lower (total factor) productivity in 
works couocil regimes (e.g. Fit7--Roy and Kraft, 1987). 
[Tables 7 and 8 near here] 
The employment e釘'ects of German works councils , charted in Table 7, do not 
offer any evidence of classic insider behavior. The association between works council 
presence and employment change 1991-94 is negative, but the coefficient estimate is 
poorly determined. 
Table 8 gives the German results for profits. The depressing effect of works 
couocils on 也is relative profitability measure is found for the total sample and the smaller 
frrm subsample alike. A simi1ar result -也1S time using the ratio of cash flow to capital 
rather than a su~jecti間， self-reported measure - was indeed reported in the early literature 
(see FitzRoy and Kraft , 1985). on these resul的， there is some indication of distributive 
bargainiog. 14 
[Table 9 near here] 
Table 9 gives the fitted wage equation and casts further light 00 the profitability 
results. W orks couocils can be seen to be associated wi出 significant1y higher earnings , 
other things being equal , and across all firms. It is not clear 仕om inspection of the data 
exactly how 也is wage advantage is secured - whether through local sett1ements exceeding 
the indus甘y tariff agreement or via wage (group) drift - but the result again underscores 
the interpretation of the profit effect as redis甘ibutive rather 血泊， s旬，由e outcome of 
cumbersome consultative procedures. 
Finally , regarding the effects of the other covariates, among the more interesting 
results are the following: the positive e旺'ects on value-added per employee of profit-
sharing schemes for managers (if not for the generality of employees) and of the 
proportion of workers with a polytechnic/university degree (if oot the proportion of s凶led
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blue-collar workers); the adverse effect of nonwage labor costs on profitability; the role of 
high-tech in stimulating employrilerit growth; and , fmally , the insignificance of flfm size 
in wage determination and indeed , more generally. 
6. Conclusions 
The Freeman-Lazear model , suitably modified to take account of union presence 
and dis甘ibutive bargaíning, apþears consistent with the British evidence. The summary 
resulû可 of Table 1 suggest clearly that in the nonunion fmn appropriate levels of worker 
involvementare chosen. However, in the union flfm worker involvement seems to have 
negative effects. Our interpretation here is that the wrong level of involvement is chosen 
because of dis甘ibutive conflict, as might be predicted from 也e Freeman-Laze訂 model.
The German results are more complicated. Large establishments with works 
councils ap恨ar to have higher productivity. The problem here is the presence of 
consistently higher earnings in works counciI regimes and the absence of any productivity 
effect in the small establishment sample. Consistently higher eamings across the" spectrutn 
of works council establishments points to rent seeking behavior, even if this phenòmenon 
does not seem to be accompanied by slower employment growth. In larger establishments 
with works councils , the issue is whether higher productivity offsev可 the profit effect 
(anticipated by the model) to yield higher total surplus. With the data at our disposal we 
cannot answer this question definitively. 
For small establishments wi出 works councils , we can rule out any increase ín .1Olnt 
surplus because of the combination of lower profitability and no increase in the value-
added productivity measure. Smaller establishments might therefore be well advised to 
consider whether there are practical altematives to works councils , that is , measures 也a1
reduce the demand for such representation among the workforce. We are currently far 
from being able to iden位有， such factors with any precision. 15 
It follows 也at in both the cases of large and small establishments further progres~ 
in analyzing the impact of works councils On efficiency requires additional data to 
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enable the researcher to get ~ bettet: h~Qle on total surplus. Even armed withsuch 
information, the story does not end here because of possible works council effects on frrm 
investments in tangible and intangible capital. That is to say , even if output is unch.anged 
in the cross section , the effect of rent seeking on investment - via a capture of the quasi-
rents to long-lived, relation-specific capital - may serve to lower efficiency (Hirsch , 
1991). Admitt~dly the limited data relating to investment behavior available to us in the 
Hannover Firm Panel (conceming the in甘oduction of new products and production 
processes in the preceding year) does not indicate that such investments are less in works 
council regimes , irrespective of the size of the establishment. But 也is falls f:征 short of a 
conclusive test. 16 
And yet the bottom line is not that participation should be mandated. Participation 
seems to work in the British case on a voluntaristi.c basis , the hallmark of that system' s 
indus住ial relations 虹adition. If we ar訊le that union regimes provide a setting analogous to 
a mandate，也en clearly the suggestion from the British evidence is 也at mandates do not 
work. Participation is of cQurse mandated in Germany and , given 也at nation' s cen甘alised
industria1 relations system - which tends to limit if not remove dis住ibutive bargaining at 
frrm Jevel - it could be argued 也at the Germans may have not got it far wrong. The 
mandate at least in terms of the basic legislation dating back to 1952 (if not 1972) might 
be seen as reflecting the interests of the two sides of indus訂y ， at least in large 自rms.
But there are nagginεworries about the "in甘usiveness" of worker involvement set 
by the German mandate - again, a reference to the smaller frrm results. Our main 
conclusion must be that it is local distributive bargaining which causes inappropriate levels 
of worker involvement, just as predicted by the Lazear-Freeman model. A mandate is not 
an easy solution to 也is problem given the heterogeneity of frrms. 
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Endnotes 
1. The following discussion abstracts from worker representation on the supervisory 
bo訂ds of companies . But 1t should be noted 由at three-quarters of the elected workforce 
representatives on company boards covered by the 1976 Codetermination Act are a1so 
members of the works council. For an English 甘anslation of the legislation described 
here , the Works Constitution Act of 1972 , as amended in 1989 , see The Federal Minister 
of Labour and Socia1 Affairs (1990). 
2. The union has only to claim that it has at least one member in the plant; no formal 
regls甘ation procedure is required , and the identity of the union member does not have to 
be disclosed. 
3. The legislation also automatically provides for "cen甘al works councils" in companies 
with more 由an one plant and for the election of "combine councils" in groups of 
companIes. 
4. For example, in establishments with between 300 and 600 employees, one (of the 9) 
works counci l1ors is released 台om any work duti郎， whereas in plants with , say , 
9，∞1-10，∞o employees eleven (of the 31) councillors are full time. 
5. It should also be noted that the works council is explicitly held to a "peace obligation" 
and cannot therefore withdraw labor. 
6. For one study of the union-works council nexus , see Müller-Jentsch (1995) 64-65. 
7. The main laws are the Employment Act of 1982 which simply requires companies with 
over 250 employees to state annually in their company reports the initiatives 由ey have 
taken to promote employee involvement, and the Finance Act of 1978 - and its 
successors - glvlng 組x concessíons to companies allocating shares to staff on an all-
employee basis (see Hyman and Mason, 1995). 
8. Full information on the sampling frame , interviews , and data editing procedure are 
provided in In台atest Sozialforschung (1995) . 
9. English 甘anslations of the first and second wave survey questionnaires are contained in 
Brand et al . (1996). We note parenthetically that because of negligible changes in works 
council statuS between the frrst and second waves , we were unable to exploit the panel 
character of the data. 
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10. Where the dependent variable is categorical rather than continuous we use the ordered 
probit estimator (Madda尬， 1983). 
11. Median establishment weekly pay data are available from the WIRS for three manual 
occupational categories. From these median values , we calculate a manual worker pay 
average for individual establishments using the employment proportions as weights. 
12. It has been argued in the German case that profit sharing for workers is an altemative 
form of worker "participation" available to more efficient managers , enabling them to 
sidestep the paraphernalia and delayed decisionmaking of a council. Al鉤， profit sharing 
for managers has been identified wi也 a more consensual management approach seeking 
compromise, and thereby lesseoing the need for workers to elect works councils 00 
defensive grounds. On these arguments , see Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner (l997b). 
13. We also experimeoted with a subsample of flfms employing 10-249 workers. The 
main findings with respect to works council impact were unaffected. Full results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
14. In the German dataset we also have access to an absolute profit measure, again based 
on a self-reported , five-element categorical measure. Grouping these categories in similar 
fashion as for the relative (to other flfms) profit measure and rerunning the equation in 
Table 8 strongly confrrmed the negative association between works council presence and 
profitability. (See also Addison , Schnabel , and Wagner , 1997a.) 
15 . Although we have elsewhere reported that teamwork is associated with a lower 
probability of observing a works council , which might hint at the presence of real 
alternatives (see Addison , Schnabel , and W agner , 1997b). 
16. More negative evidence , on the basis of actual investments in physical capital , albeit 
for a much smaller sample , is reported in Addison , Kraft, and Wagner (1993). 
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Table l: Summary Result軍: ..f~r Germany alld Britain of the EtTects of Work剝­
Involveme"t 00 Firm Performance and Wages 
Gennany - works couDcil effect 
All establishments Establishments with 21-
100 employees 
Va1ue-added per worker positive (5%) lnslg 
Employmeot change mS1g lnslg 
Profit level negative (1 %) negative (1 % ) 
Wage level positive (1 % ) positive (1 0/0) 
Brita訓- index or infonnation 8nd joint consultatioD 
effect 
Union establishments Nonunion establishments 
Labor productivity change mSlg positive (1 0/0) 
Employment change negative (1 0/0) positive (5 010) 
Profit level negative (1 %) lnstg 
Wage level mSlg positive (1 %) 
Notes: The table gives the sign of the coefficient estimate on the works council dummy 
for Gennany and 00 the index measure of infonnation and joint consultatìon (levels or 
changes) for Britain. The tìgures in parentheses denote significance levels. Union 
establishments in Britain are defined as those with a written agreement recognizing 
either manual or nonmanual uruOIl5 for negotiating pay and conditions of empIoyment; 
nonunion establishments, as defined, do not necessarily record zero union density 
Source: Tables 2.9 
Table2: Britain . ... .Effects of Worker Involvement . 00 Labor 'P,roductivity and 
Employmeot Change, NonunioD Establisbments 
Labor Productivity Changea Employment Changeb 
Vari噎住一一一一一一一……_~(!2___一 ~.~_(~l~..____一…一__{!2. _~.~_一…-(止一---
Constant -0.004 -0.016 -22.644 -17.255 
Finn age 
(age in years) 
ln (Finn size) 
(logarithm of Firm size) 
New JCC 
(dummy= 1 if JCC 
reorganized or estab1ished, 
1987-90) 
New Infcon 
(dummy-l ifincrease in 
Infcon, 1987-90) 
NEWINVindex 
(index of JCC and Infcon 
increases; range 0-3) 
Single establishment 
(dummy= 1 if single 
establishment) 
FemaJe 
(petcentage female) 
SkilJed 
(percentage skilled workers) 
Part time 
(percentage pa吋 time)
Shift 
(dummy= 1 if shift work used) 
Piece rate 
(dummy= 1 if payments by 
results used for any work 
group) 
Market power 
(dununy= 1 if dominant 
finnlfew competitors) 
Export 
( dummy= 1 if product mainly 
exported) 
Automated 
( dummy= 1 if automated 
mac恤les used) 
Profit sharing 
(dummy= l ifused) 
Density 
(percentage of work force in 
(0.004) (0 .016) (0 .497) (0.380) 
0.023** 0.023** -1.284* -1.317* 
(2 .139) (2 .136) (1 .854) (1.910) 
。 189 0.191 14.272* 13 .500* 
(1. 120) (1. 138) (1.872) (1 .776) 
0.714*** 
(2.969) 
-0.] 23 
(0.884) 
0.010** 
(2 .313) 
0.009*** 
(4.349) 
0.001 
(0 .462) 
0.038 
(0.248) 
。505**
(2 .461 ) 
0.131 
(0.844) 
0.288 
(1. 111) 
0.211 
(1.005) 
0.308** 
(2.273) 
-0.009** 
(2.484) 
1. 562** 14.271 
(2.251) (0.710) 
0.649** 
(2.048) 
.0.120 
(0.843) 
0.010** 
(2.332) 
0.009*** 
(4.359) 
0.001 
(0 .453) 
0.038 
(0.244) 
。 513**
(2 .417) 
。 129
(0.834) 
0.287 
(1. 100) 
0.206 
(0 .980) 
0.316** 
(2.266) 
-0.009** 
(2.483) 
19.005** 
(2.270) 
1. 518 
(0.157) 
-0.108 
(0 .476) 
0.020 
(0.146) 
。044
(0.197) 
6.70] 
(0.685) 
-6.275 
(0.506) 
8.836 
(0.930) 
15 .594 
(1.040) 
-30.089*** 
(2.669) 
0.106 
(0.012) 
。033
(0.138) 
41. 536*** 
(3 .072) 
0.144 
(0.015) 
-0 .134 
(0.592) 
0.013 
(0.097) 
0.060 
(2.70) 
7.028 
(0.722) 
-10.055 
(0.806) 
8.845 
(0.935) 
16.356 
(1.096) 
明30.080*糾
(2.680) 
-2.209 
(0.241) 
0.053 
(0.224) 
Table 3: Britain - Effects of Worker Involv~ment 00 Labor Productivity a lÍd 
Employment Change, U nion Establishments 
Labor Productivity Change Employment Change 
一封的些一一呵，一一一一 ， 一一 一 月 一一 (!2 .. ………"'....-......-.. . 0;仿 _.-.-..-一 一~(D_.…一一…正在一一
Constant 4.165 4.366 -]2 1.59*** -108 .01** 
(1. 233) (1 .256) (2.634) (2.437) 
Firm age 0.055* 0.057* -0.347 -0.326 
(1. 928) (1. 945) (0.322) (0 .3 16) 
1n (Firm size) -0.317 國0 . 339 25 .909*** 2 1.794*** 
(1. 128) (1. 228) (4.083) (3.561) 
New JCC 國0 . 163 -159.86*** 
(0.301) (7 .916) 
New Infcon 0.514 19.362* 
(1. 353) (1.699) 
NEWINV index 0 . 1 日 -35 . 696***
(0.906) (4 .790) 
Single establishment ~. 387 -0.293 4.955 15.342 
(1 .313) (0.776) (0.284) (0.911) 
Female -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.664** -0.342 
(3 .362) (3 .286) (2 .520) (1. 328) 
Slcilled 0.002 0.001 0.598*** 0.562*** 
(0.711) (0.302) (3.917) (3 .833) 
Part time 0.015 0.013 -0.130 -0.348 
(1.498) (1 .209) (0.444) (1.231) 
Shiftwork 0.278 0 . 264 個5 . 658 -9.258 
(0.885) (0.821) (0 .454) (0.774) 
Piece rate l252*1246*22.10230297** 
(1 .770) (1. 742) (1 .547) (2 .202) 
Market power"。 293431624101**25535料
(0.993) (1 .070) (1 .986) (2.194) 
Export O 506O 453.7225.17775 
(1. 238) (1 .076) (0 .400) (1. 022) 
Automated O O6l O O22-19336*-21 .487材
(0.198) (0 .070) (1.863) (2. J 58) 
proat sharing O 362O 41907005153 
(1.460) (1. 519) (0.062) (0.474) 
Density -O OO64.0084466**"。 549***
(1 .328) (1. 530) (2 .311) (2.832) 
1史的做些Mi--………pcluded 一 included included included 
Pseudo R L 0.408 一一一百石了、…… 0. 115 0.228 
n ……………………… 23三…- 237449449
/t/-values in parentheses 
Notes: * , * * , * * * denotes sígnificance at the . 10多 0 . 05 ， and .. 01 Jevels, respectively. 
See Table 2 for definition of variables 
unions) 
坐坐笠旦旦旦控啞巴i…一一一-MUM--JJ旦旦控告， ism- …i哇啦ded…斗哩luded
Pseudo RL 0.244 0.196 0.018 0 .079 
n 291 291 424 424 
Itl-values in parentheses. 
Notes: *, **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively 
a The manager's assessment ofthe level oflabor productivity in the 
establishment relative to three years ago, 1987-90 
b Employment change, 1987-90 
Table 4: Britain 圓 Effects of Worker ,lnvolvement 00 Profitability and Wage 
Levels, Nonunion Establisbments …
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。 172 0.176 8.277* 8.586* 
(1.273) (1. 303) (1. 784) (1. 853) 
0.005 0.005 -1. 004*** 間1. 024***
(1. 602) (1. 577) (8.188) (8.330) 
-0 .002 -0.002 0.339*** 0.322*** 
(0.920) (0.985) (4.726) (4 .456) 
-0.004 -0.004 -1. 043*** -1. 050*** 
(1. 543) (1. 562) (9.201) (9.280) 
-0 .189 -0.180 -5 .338 -4 .470 
(1. 557) (1. 448) (1. 135) (0.947) 
-0.526*** -0.537*** -0 .051 圈。 871
(3 .076) (3 .141) (0 ∞9) (0.149) 
向0.153 -0.159 -4 .427 -4.990 
(1. 142) (l. 182) (0.969) (1. 091) 
-0 .324 -0 .308 38.740*** 40.132*** 
(1. 611) (1. 514) (5 .319) (5 .486) 
0.316* 0.315* 6.943 6.336 
(1. 741) (1 .729) (1. 304) (1 .190) 
0.039 0.038 -3 .634 -4 .248 
(0 .321) (0 .312) (0.810) (0.946) 
0.001 0 ∞ 0 . 292*** 0 .294*** 
(0.260) (0.244) (2 .684) (2.711) 
坐坐監盒里住一一一一一些旦控告LJ叫的d一一 included încluded 
Pseudo R2 0.094 一一一可誦了一 O .茄子一一 o三09
止，一一一一一一一…-iZ」一 -ZL一 - 364 364 一一
Itl-values in parentheses 
Notes: * ** *艸 denote significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively 
Finn age 
ln (Firm size) 
JCC 
(dummy= 1 if Joint Consu1tative 
Cùmmittee present) 
Infcon 
( dummy= 1 if regular meetings 
to communicate/consu1t) 
D刊r index 
(index of JCC and Infcon levels~ 
range 0-3) 
Single establishment 
Female 
Ski1led 
Part time 
Shifu九Tork
Piece rate 
Market power 
Export 
Automated 
Profitsharing 
Density 
0.007 
(0.051) 
12.428*** 
(2.673) 
-0.051 
(0.668) 
5.889** 
(2 .496) 
, a Profitability lsan index meaSOre 'definedi as the rrùinag缸~ s asse'Ssment of the 
establishment ' s financial performance relative to other establishments in the 
same industry , 
b Wages are defined as average pay for manua1 workers 
Al1 other variables are as defi.ned in Table 2 
Table 5: Britain . Effects of Worker Involvement on Profit and Wage Levels, 
U oion Establishments 
Profit VVages 
Va哇哇ble 一………一一一一 .- ..... -. . ..~..~ --一一，一 … ~___i})一…一一一-_. _~~}一 … _ .. ._Q1______ 叫一一一一位一一一--
Constant 2.152** 2.456* ** 147.97 *** 145 .47*** 
(2 .530) (2.812) (7.704) (7 .485) 
Finn age -0.070*** -0 .071 *** 0.306 0.252 
(4 .796) (4.710) (0 .732) (0 .595) 
In (Firm size) 0.203 0.189 2.047 2.245 
(1. 240) (1 .158) (0 .705) (0.171) 
JCC -0 .164 -6 .4 18 
(0.699) (1. 236) 
Infcon -0.474** 1.842 
(2 .227) (0 .357) 
INV index -0. 1 79艸 -2 . 125
(2.010) (0 .938) 
Single estabIishment -0.260 -0.330 9.021 9.574 
(1. 047) (1 .257) (1 .309) (1. 383) 
Female 0.0002 0.002 -1. 189*** -1. 190*** 
(0 .049) (0 .322) (10.20) (10.212) 
Ski1Ied 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.183*** 0.189*** 
(3 .506) (2 .959) (2 .649) (2.724) 
Part time -0 . 01 戶 -0 . 011 * -1. 922*** -1.932*** 
(1 .910) (1. 774) (1 5.13) (1 5.138) 
Shiftwork -0.835*** -0.836*** 18.760*** 19.184*** 
(3 .979) (3 .882) (3 .816) (3 .881) 
Píecerate 0.216 0 .2 11 -2 .268 -2 .172 
(0 .987) (0 .952) (0.3 83) (0.367) 
Market power -0 . 528叫* -0.540*** 3.827 4.026 
(3 .039) (3 .042) (0.792) (0.832) 
Export .0229-0207.lo 650-11352 
(0.843) (0.753) (1. 526) ( 1. 615) 
Automated 0 .743*** 0.714*** 6 .303 6.232 
(3 .340) (3 .254) (1. 308) (1. 293) 
proat sharing O 405**0.337*19662***19839*** 
(2 .041) (1. 657) (4 .269) (4.301) 
Density AOO64006O I32 0. i21 
(1. 369) (1 .313) (1.466) (1 .332) 
也吸Iy~umqEL--……一…主些1世些一一 includedncluded included 
Pseudo RL 0ω3打川示丸4 一一一一-可v一一w苟 可3沛子η77γ一 ……0.598 一 0.612 吋
l ………凡叫』
|川t叫J -value的s in parentheses 
Notes:﹒弋*大*村 denote significance at the . 10， 的 ， and .01 levels, respectively. 
See Tables 2 and 4 for definition of variables 
Table 6: Germany ﹒ Effi忱的 ofW 000 Councils 00 Value-Added Per Worker 
All establishments Establishments with 
(percentage skilled workers [Facharbeiter]) 
Degree 
(percentage with PolytechniclUniversity 
degree) 
Part time 
(percentage pa吋 time)
Shift work 
(dummy= 1 if shift work used) 
Hours 
(Usual number ofhours worked per week) 
Capacity 3.74*** 
(index for capacity utilization, ranging 台01n (2 .64) 
1 (<85 percent) to 6(> 1 00 percent)) 
Advanced technology 
(dummy= 1 if state-of-the-art production 
technolo勘r)
Profit sharing for employees 
(dummy= 1 ifused) 
Profit sharing for management 
( dummy= 1 if used) 
Market share 
(dummy= 1 if market share of main product 
more than 50/0 in main market) 
J對旦旦旦血旦旦全L一一一一 inc1uded included 
R2 ………日一一一……叫一血一一‘…τu互互茲94 一…n……2一…一τ芳5τ一一一…H……血…圖一
n ………奮申胃一……h
i性tl←-va訓lu肘les in parentheses →一……一…巴…一一一……一…
Notes: * , **, *** denotes significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively. 
Variable 
Constant 
Works council 
(dummy= 1 if works council present) 
Firm size 
(number of employees) 
Firm size squared 
Branch plant 
(dummy= 1 if branch plant) 
Fírm age 
( dummy= 1 if founded before 1960) 
Female 
(percentage female) 
Skilled 
66.82 
(0 .81 ) 
15 .40* * 
(2 .48) 
-0.03** 
(2 .03) 
0 .11 E-4 
(1. 75) 
11. 10 
(1.44) 
-1 1.72** 
(2 .29) 
-0.70*** 
(4.20) 
-0.10 
(0 .84) 
l.24*** 
(2 .86) 
-0.50*** 
(2.66) 
2 1.01 *** 
(3 .10) 
0 .70 
(0.34) 
9.52* 
(1 .86) 
6 .75 
(0.95) 
11.93** 
(2.42) 
-1 .83 
(0 .33) 
一 - 21.1QQCImi啞巴竺s
45 .91 
(0 .37) 
9 .43 
(1.27) 
1. 20 
(1.63) 
0 .01 
(1 .62) 
5.16 
(0 .45) 
2.65 
(0 .43) 
-0 .43* 
(1.92) 
。05
(0 .41) 
1.93** 
(2 .21) 
-0.67** 
(2 .51) 
22.08*** 
(2 .79) 
0.95 
(0.30) 
4 .36** 
(2 .13) 
0.97 
(0 .16) 
* * 
、
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Table 7: Germany 國 EtTects ofWorks Councilson Employment Changea 
AlI establishments Establishments wÍth 
丘?φ1β7空t吋哇立.………U …M…….一曰一島叫一……‘一 】一、..……一A一…-
Constant -11 .002 -70.831 
Works council 
Firm size 
Finn size squared 
Branch plant 
Firm age 
Female 
Skilled 
Degree 
Part time 
Shift work 
Short time 
(dummy = 1 if short-time work used) 
Overtime 
(dummy= 1 if overtime used) 
Capacity utilization 
Advanced technology 
Wages 
(dummy= 1 if higher than coIlective 
agreement) 
(0.86) (1. 29) 
-6 .600 -1. 210 
(1. 15) (0 .13) 
-0.023 0.969 
(1.61) (0.73) 
0.16 E-5 -0.87 E-2 
(1.62) (0 .75) 
-7.621 -2.880 
(1 .28) (0.20) 
-14.649 * * -13 .713 
(2.22) (1.24) 
。.024 -0.115 
(0.24) (0 .45) 
。015 -0.049 
(0.22) (0 .37) 
3.869* 12.104 
(1. 71) (1. 40) 
-0.269 -0 .260 
(1. 52) (0.82) 
5.285 9.750 
(0.80) (1. 10) 
-1 1. 3 12 * * * -7.758 
(3 .10) (0.96) 
14.176*** 13 .264 
(2.63) (1.63) 
0.395 -1.221 
(0.18) (0 .45) 
9.813*** 6.255 
(2 .61) (0.90) 
-10.809 -18 . 1 14 
(0.95) (1.23) 
且也笠立坐控告s ……一一一……一一且空空空一一一…且坐到三d
R2 0.126 0.290 
n 848 353 
\t\-values in parentheses 
Notes: * , **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05 , and .01 levels, respectively 
a Employment change Îs measured over 1991-94 
see Table 6 for definition of other variables 
Table 8: Germ30y - Eff~ts of Works Couß,ils 00 Profitability~ . 
一一一…...-.，..--....................................~"".... ..， .......... '~....~-----~一一……一…
Variable 
W orks council 
Firm size 
Firm size squared 
弘1:arket share 
Capacity utilization 
Advanced technology 
Profit sharing for employees 
Profit sharing for management 
Wage costs 
(dummy= l ifwage costs judged too high) 
Non wage labor costs 
(dummy= 1 if non-wage labor costs judged 
too high) 
All establishments 
-0.327* ** 
(3 .39) 
0.214 E-3 
(1 .14) 
-9 .40 E-9 
(0 .63) 
0.258*** 
(2 .63) 
0.099*** 
(3 .20) 
0.338*** 
(3.76) 
0.119 
(1 .01) 
。405***
(4 .37) 
-0 .036 
(0.39) 
-0.483*** 
(4 .74) 
Establishments with 
21-1.Q9.. ~'.l1pl.<?y~e~ 
-0.606*** 
(3 .89) 
0.012 
(0 .67) 
-0 .77E-4 
(0.53) 
0.119 
(0 .79) 
0.100** 
(2.04) 
0.326** 
(2.18) 
0.3 13* 
(1. 68) 
0.217 
(1.44) 
-0 .040 
(0 .26) 
-0.757*** 
(4.15) 
lnd白皮且也mmt設一一………昕一-……… mc控告ι一…一…」Ehded
R2 0.095 0.157 
n 817 335 
Itl-values in parentheses 
N otes: * , * *, * * * denote significance at the . 10，的 ， and .01 levels, respectively. 
a Profitability is an index measure derived on the basis of the manager' s 
assessment of performance relative to other firms in the same industry 
See Table 6 for definition of other variables 
Table 9: Germany . Effects of Works Councils 00 Wagesa 
AlI establishments Establishments with 
y~.~.~!~ .. - ....__.. . - ... . .._........ ..... .一← 21-1 1∞_~Qloy~es 也Constant 10.82*** 11. 58*** 
(22 .88) (12 .93) 
Works council 0.14*** 0.17*** 
(3 .49) (2 .61) 
Firm size -0 .53 E-4 -0 .01 
(0 .78) (1 55) 
Firm size squared -0 .35 E-8 0.86 E-4 
(0 .82) (1 .61) 
Branch plant -0 .04 -0.11 
(0.73) (0 .75) 
Firm age 。59 E-3 -0.04 
(0.02) (0.62) 
Female 
-0.30E-2*** -0.17E-2 
(3 .26) (1. 02) 
Skilled 
-0.16 E-2** -0.16 E-2 
(2.20) (1. 33) 
Degree 0.01 *** 0.94 E-2** 
Part time 
(5 .29) (2.00) 
-0.80 E-2*** -0.82 E-2** 
(4 .53) (2.39) 
0.10*** 0.07 Shift work 
(2 .84) (1. 28) 
-0.68 E-3 -0.02 Hours 
(0.06) (0.71) 
0 . 07 制定 0.13** Overtime 
(2 .23) (2 .25) 
。.05 0.08 Profit sharing for employees 
(1. 16) (1 .20) 
-0.03 -0.03 Market share 
(l.06) (0.63) 
主控曰:金組豆豆甘一一一一一一一一一 incJud吋 included 
RL 一一一一-1滿一一……可否γ一一……
土一一……一一一…一一…掏 E E jg 一 ~d u 34空 間 ......T.ID.......:IA_..."" Itl-va1ues in parentheses 
Notes: * , * *, * * * denote sìgnificance at the .10
, 
. 05歹 and .01 ]evels~ respectively a The dependent variabie is the naturai ioguithn ofthe average wage per 
employee 
See TabJes 6 and 7 for definition of variables 
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